Abstract In this paper we address a privacy preserving version of the well known Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization procedure. Specifically, we propose a building block for secure multiparty computation, that is able to orthogonalize a set of componentwise encrypted vectors. Our setting is the following: Bob needs to compute this orthogonalization on some vectors encrypted with the public key of Alice. Hence our intent is not to propose a stand-alone protocol to solve a specific scenario or a specific application, but rather to develop a sub-protocol to be embedded in more complex algorithms or protocols where the vectors to be orthogonalized can be the result of previous computations. We show that our protocol is secure in the honest but curious model and evaluate its computation complexity.
Introduction
The classical way to protect sensitive information from misuse is to encrypt it as soon as the information is generated and to store it in an encrypted form. However, when the information needs to be processed, it is necessary to decrypt it, hence creating a weakness in the security of the whole process. The problem with the classical approach is the assumption that the owner of the data and the party in charge of processing it trust each other: the encryption layer is used only to protect the data against third parties. In many cases, however, the owner of the information may not trust the third-parties that are asked to manipulate the sensitive informations. In this scenario the possibility of applying particular cryptographic techniques to process encrypted data has received a considerable attention in the last years. The problem of computing with encrypted data has been intensively studied in the past 30 years [21] . Following that direction, researchers developed many protocols to be applied in applications where the privacy and the security of the inputs are crucial. The proposed applications range from heuristic search in encrypted graphs [12] ; ElectroCardioGram (ECG) classification [4] ; data mining [1] ; face recognition [11] ; remote diagnosis [7] .
In this paper, we consider a scenario in which two parties are interested in computing a given functionality in a privacy preserving way, but this functionality needs a sub-protocol that computes the Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization on encrypted vectors. Our intent is to study this particular sub-protocol, giving a detailed description comprehensive of security proof and complexity evaluation.
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has never been addressed so far. Therefore this work focuses on the problem of developing a protocol that realizes the Gram -Schmidt procedure in a privacy preserving fashion. There are a lot of applications in which this kind of sub-protocol could be embedded as a basic privacy preserving primitive, including: QR decomposition [13] ; linear least squares problems [6] ; face recognition [24] ; improving performances of neural networks [19] ; wavelets computation [9] ; principal component analysis [22] and image compression [18] .
Signal Processing in the Encrypted Domain
The classical security model is targeted towards protecting the communication between two trusted parties against a third malicious party. In such cases it is sufficient to secure the transmission layer that stays on top of the processing blocks. Most of the applications today, work in this way, for instance when you log in a website, only the transmission is protected and on the other side the website is able to interpret your data in plain form while eventual thirds parties can see only an encrypted communication.
In the last years, the number of applications in which the classical model in not longer adequate has considerably increased since there are several non-trusted parties involved in the process of communication, distribution and processing data. Consider for example a remote diagnosis service (say Bob) where a non-trusted party is asked to process some medical data (owned by Alice) to provide a preliminary diagnosis. It is evident that the security of the users of such a system would be more easily granted if the server was able to carry out the task without getting any knowledge about the data provided by the users (not even the final result). Similarly the service provider may desire to keep the algorithms he is using to process the data secret, since they represent the basis for the service he is providing. Clearly the possibility of such kind of computation would be of invaluable help in situations like those described above.
Without being too specific and avoiding to discuss the details required by a precise definition, we may define secure signal processing or signal processing in the encrypted domain a collection of techniques that permit to solve the following problem: given the signals x 1 and x 2 signals (or data) belonging to Alice and Bob, compute the output of known function f (x 1 , x 2 ) without that Alice (Bob) gets any information about x 2 (x 1 ) in addition to that inferable from the output of the computation itself. As generalization it is possible to consider the case in which f (.) is known only to a party and it has to be kept secret as well.
The number of possible applications of these techniques is virtually endless. Among the most interesting scenarios investigated so far we mention: private database access [1] , in which the Alice accesses a server owned by Bob by means of an encrypted query; private data mining [17] , in which two or more parties wish to extract aggregate information from a dataset formed by the union of their private data; secure processing of biometric data [8] , in which biometric signals are processed in the encrypted domain to protect the privacy of the owners; watermarking of encrypted signals [16] , for digital rights management within buyer-seller protocols; recommender systems [3] , in which user's data is analyzed without disclosing it; privacy-preserving processing of medical data [4] , in which sensitive medical data is processed by a non-trusted party, for remote medical diagnosis or any other form of home-care system whereby health conditions are monitored remotely.
Notation and Preliminaries
In the last few years, new techniques related to homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation showed that it is possible to perform several kinds of computations directly in the encrypted domain in an efficient way and without revealing the information hidden inside the cryptogram [2] . Following this direction, researchers developed many protocols where the protection of the inputs provided by the various parties involved in the computation is a crucial goal. The present work is part of this research streamline.
In the rest of the paper we will use the following notation:
• with < ·, · > we indicate the inner product: < a, b >= ∑ n i=1 a i b i ; • with a we indicate the Paillier [20] encryption of a; if a is a vector we always indicate with a the componentwise encryption of a; • s is the cryptosystem security parameter (i.e. for short term security 1024 bit) and is the bit size of a cryptogram 1 , moreover Z N is the ring in which the cryptosystem is defined (s = log 2 N ).
We recall that the following basic mapping 2 holds for Paillier's cryptosystem: x y = x + y and x y = xy .
Moreover we recall the Big-O notation [15] that measures the computational complexity in bit operations. Assuming that the biggest number involved in the computation has bits we have add = O( ) to compute addition or mult = O( 2 ) to compute multiplication and finally exp = O( 3 ) to compute exponentiation. In the rest of this paper we often need to compute exponentiation by −1 (or negative numbers), this operation is equivalent to compute the multiplicative inverse in the space of the ciphertexts (namely Z * N 2 ), this operation can be computed by using the extended GCD and its computational complexity is equal to compute an exponentiation, so O( 3 ). Furthermore we remind that for Paillier cryptosystem enc ≈ dec = O( 3 ).
Basic Building Blocks
In this section we introduce some basic building boxes that we will use to construct our protocol.
eMul
The first sub-protocol, eMul, allows to compute the product of two Paillier ciphertexts obtaining xy = eMul( x , y ) and is a well-known technique. Let us recall it. Suppose that Bob owns x and y encrypted with the public key of Alice, he can obfuscate both cryptograms adding two random numbers due to homomorphic additive properties and obtain x + r x and y + r y . Now he sends these cryptograms to Alice, she decrypts and multiplies them finding: w = xy + xr y + yr x + r x r y , she encrypts it and sends back to Bob that computes: 2 To be more precise, we have that given an instance of a Paillier cryptosystem and defined as E and D the functionalities of encryption and decryption respectively, the following properties hold: 
obtaining exactly the product of the two encryptions.
Computing eMul requires 2 rounds (one from Bob to send the obfuscated ciphertexts and one from Alice to send back the result) and a bandwidth of 3 (3 ciphertexts are sent) with a computational complexity equal to: 3 exp needed to compute x −r y , y −r x and r x r y −1 ; 5 mult needed to obfuscate x , y and to compute the additions to w ; 2 dec to obtain in plain x + r x and y + r y and finally 1 enc to encrypt the result, for a total asymptotic number of 6 exp operations. Later in this paper we refer to eMul using the following notation: eMul( x , y ) = x • y .
eInv
To realize our construction we will use another building block: eInv. This subprotocol works as follow: given an encrypted value x we have:
To reach this goal we use a multiplicative blinding approach [14] , in fact assuming T sufficiently bigger than x the multiplicative blinding T x ca be assumed to be secure 3 . By this, Bob can compute T x = x T by homomorphic properties and send the result to Alice that is able to decrypt obtaining T x. Now, she computes 1 T x encrypts it and sends back to Bob 1 T x . Bob removes the multiplicative blinding due to homomorphic properties:
T and obtain the desired result.
Computing eInv requires 2 rounds and a bandwidth of 2 because only two cryptograms are sent: 1 from Bob and 1 from Alice. The computational complexity can be measured as: 1 exp for the multiplicative blinding, 1 dec for decryption, 1 enc for encryption and 1 exp to remove the blinding; for a total of 4 exp bit operations.
eDot
Another basic building block our protocol relies on is the the inner product between two encrytped vectors. More formally: given x and y encrypted with Alice's public key, the protocol eDot( x , y ) computes < x, y > . To realize this subprotocol it is possible to use data obfuscation. Given two vectors of random values r x and r y , generated by Bob, he is able to evaluate the obfuscation of x and y as the componentwise product: x r x = x + r x and y r y = y + r y . At this point Bob can send to Alice these two vectors of obfuscated values. Alice decrypts them and computes:
encrypts the scalar product obtaining:
r xi r y i . Then she sends it back to Bob. Bob has to remove the obfuscation, to do this consider that:
r xi r y i (4) moreover Bob can compute:
by using the additive property of the cryptosystem and the fact that he knows r x and r y in plain. Hence Bob can compute:
Computing eDot requires 2 rounds: one to send the obfuscated vectors to Alice and one to send back the result; with a bandwidth of (2n + 1) , because Bob sends 2 vectors of length n and Alice returns only 1 ciphertext. About the computational complexity we have: Table 1 shows the three complexities of the sub-protocols described so far. 
Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization on Encrypted Vectors
In the following section we introduce our construction to compute Gram -Schmidt orthogonalization on encrypted vectors. First of all we give a brief description of Gram -Schmidt process in its plain version, than we examine our privacy preserving protocol paying attention to security requirements and complexities.
Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization in the Plain Domain
Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization is a procedure for the orthogonalization of a set of vectors in a Euclidean space [23] . Given a set V of m vectors, it is possible to show that Algorithm 1 replaces V with a set of orthogonal vectors.
Algorithm 1 Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization
1:
for all j = 1 to i − 1 do 4:
end for 6:
Note that the computational complexity is asymptotically equal to O(nm 2 ) multiplications [13] . Adding a normalization step at the end of Algorithm 1 it is possible to obtain an orthonormalized set. However techniques for the normalization of encrypted vectors are out the scope of this paper.
Privacy Preserving Gram -Schmidt Protocol
We consider the case in which Bob owns a set of componentwise encrypted vectors with the public key of Alice and he needs to extract an orthogonalized version of them. For sake of simplicity we assume that V is a set of linearly independent vectors; this choice avoids the necessity of catching a division by zero. Otherwise it is possible considering a variant where Bob asks to Alice to check if < v i , v i > is equal to zero, if is this the case Alice just sends back the encryption of zero 4 . We already introduced all the basic blocks we will use (See Section 4), so we can translate Algorithm 1 in the following Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 Privacy Preserving Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization
During
Step 1 we use sub-protocols eInv and eDot to compute s 1 = 1 <v 1 ,v 1 > used later in Step 4 to scale the projection. The main part is Step 4 where using sub-protocols eDot and eMul it is possible calculate v i = v i − < v i , v j > s j v j .
Security Discussion
To discuss the security of our construction we simply recall that in each step the data are encrypted when used by Bob or obfuscated, when used by Alice. Thus the privacy is achieved in the honest but curious model [10] due to IND-CPA property of Paillier cryptosystem and the security of obfuscation.
Complexities
We now briefly discuss the complexity of the proposed protocol. We assume that Bob already owns the vectors so in our complexity evaluation we do not consider: the bandwidth, the rounds and the operations needed to manipulate the vectors until the beginning of this protocol. We will examine the two principal steps in the protocol:
Step 4 and Step 6 (this is equal to Step 1). During Step 4 there are 2n + 1 calls to eMul and 1 to eDot, so 4n + 3 rounds are needed with a bandwidth of (2n + 7) . Finally resulting in a computational complexity of (16n + 8) exp. Now, consider that it is necessary to execute Step 4
times. Summarizing Step 4 requires:
rounds; a bandwidth of
and a computational complexity of:
exp. Finally Step 6 requires m executions and for each of them is just 1 call to eInv and 1 to eDot, so we can affirm that: 2m + 2m = 4m rounds are needed with a bandwidth 5 (2 + n + 1)m = (3 + n)m and a computational complexity (4 + 4n + 2) exp = (6 + 4n)m exp. Summarizing we have:
Step 4 + 4m
Step 6 O(nm 2 )
rounds, for a bandwidth of:
Step 4 + (3 + n)m
Step 6
bits, and eventually:
    m(m + 1)(16n + 8) 2
Step 4 + (6 + 4n)m
bit operations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a secure protocol to compute the Gram -Schmidt Orthogonalization on vectors encrypted with an additive homomorphic cryptosystem like Paillier's. We proved that our construction is secure because nothing is revealed to the parties. The idea was to propose a building block that could be used off the shelf in more complex privacy-preserving systems. To achieve our goal, we proved the protocol to be secure in the honest but curious model. Moreover we show all the complexities involved: bandwidth, rounds and bit operations. In the future, various improvements can be investigated, for instance, it is clear that for a real use of this protocol it is necessary to quantize the vectors because cryptosystems work on integer number representation, so a study of the error introduced by quantization will be really needed for practical implementations. Furthermore, techniques to normalize the encrypted vectors will be useful to generate an orthonormal version of the basis. Finally, it is possible to use techniques like those proposed in [5] to study a packetized version of our construction that could be much more efficient.
